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9.1 Introduction
Until the 1980s, China’s miraculous economic growth had been led by
publicly owned township and village enterprises (TVEs), which may be
more accurately termed township- and village-run enterprises, or TVREs
(Chen, Jeﬀerson, and Singh 1992; Jeﬀerson, Rawski, and Zheng 1996; Ot-
suka, Liu, and Murakami 1998).1 In the 1990s, however, the private sector
emerged to become the leading sector of the economy in China. In the
southeastern part of Jiangsu province, where the successful record of eco-
nomic development based on TVREs in the 1980s was dubbed the “Sunan
Model of Industrial Development,” the privatization of TVREs was taking
place in the late 1990s. Further, the growth rate of the Zhejiang province,
which depended consistently on the growth of the private sector beginning
in the 1980s, outweighed that of most other provinces, including Jiangsu,
in the 1990s (Zhang 1999).
By now it is well known that privatization has been taking place rapidly
and widely in China, but it is much less well known whether, and to what
extent, privatization has improved resource allocation and productivity.2
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1. Note that TVEs include both TVREs and private enterprises.
2. An exceptional and pioneering study is Li and Rozelle (2000).eﬀects of TVE privatization? If the recent privatization results in the im-
provement of production eﬃciency, then why did it not take place earlier?
Also, it is interesting to ask why TVREs prospered in Jiangsu in the 1980s.
These issues are critically important in understanding the growth perfor-
mance of the Chinese economy in the 1990s and in assessing its future
growth potential for the early decades of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
As a ﬁrst step toward a fuller understanding of the eﬀects of TVE priva-
tization on productivity, this study looks at the garment and metal-casting
enterprises in the Greater Yangtze River Region, extending from the sub-
urbs of Shanghai to the western border of Anhui province. Among the com-
mon and important characteristics of TVREs in the suburbs of Shanghai
and southern Jiangsu are their dependence on state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) in technology, management, and marketing (Otsuka, Liu, and
Murakami 1998). Some TVREs used to be cooperative TVEs or “branch
factories” of urban SOEs; managers were sent from SOEs and the proﬁts
were shared between them in accordance with their investment shares (Fu-
dan University Economic Research Center 1988). “Putting-out contracts”
frequently were made, not only between SOEs and their branches but
also between SOEs and independent TVREs. Moreover, TVREs often pur-
chased second-hand machines used by SOEs and employed retired SOE
workers in order to acquire the technology and management know-how
of the SOEs (Murakami, Liu, and Otsuka 1994, 1996). It seems that town-
ship and village governments supported such transactions and coopera-
tion through their direct involvement in enterprise management.3
Our maintained hypothesis is that this cooperation between TVREs
and SOEs was mutually beneﬁcial, at least in the light industries during
the 1980s.4 TVREs faced largely unregulated management environments,
but lacked technology, management know-how, and marketing capacity. In
contrast, the management of SOEs was tightly regulated, even though they
had decent management, technology, and marketing knowledge. In the
1990s, two major changes seem to have taken place, which eroded the ad-
vantage of the TVRE-SOE cooperation. First, TVREs absorbed the pro-
duction knowledge and capacity of SOEs, so that the payoﬀ to maintain-
ing cooperative relationships with SOEs gradually declined (Liu and
Otsuka 1998). Second, a free-market system developed, so that direct gov-
ernment support for inter-enterprise transactions, particularly face-to-face
transactions between TVREs and SOEs in our context, tended to lose sig-
niﬁcance (Li 1996; Hsiao et al. 1998; Jin and Qian 1998; Chen and Rozelle
1999). Therefore, we hypothesize that privatization in the late 1990s re-
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3. This view is consistent with the justiﬁcation of TVREs by Che and Qian (1998), who ar-
gue that the advantage of local government ownership lies in reduction of state predation.
4. Lin and Yao (2001) contend that the development of the SOE sector tended to help the
development of the TVE sector in the light industries, whereas the opposite was the case in
the heavy industries.sulted in signiﬁcant improvements in production eﬃciency by enhancing
management incentives without sacriﬁcing marketing eﬃciencies.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, our sam-
pling scheme is explained, and the basic statistics of our sample enter-
prises, such as the growth rate of valued-added, are presented. In section
9.3, we examine the changing importance of subcontracting transactions
with SOEs and the changing distribution of stock ownership by the local
government vis-à-vis private owners. Then we assess the impacts of priva-
tization on productivity by estimating a function that explains the growth
rate of per-worker value-added, separately for the garment and metal-
casting industries, in section 9.4. The implications of this study are dis-
cussed in the ﬁnal section.
9.2 Data
To analyze the determinants and consequences of TVRE privatization,
we use data collected by a rural-enterprise survey conducted in 1999 and
2000 in the Greater Yangtze River Region, from the suburbs of Shanghai
to about 650 kilometers upstream. The study includes ﬁve counties in the
suburbs of Shanghai, nineteen counties in the south of the Yangtze River
in Jiangsu province, and twenty-nine counties between the Yangtze and the
Huai He rivers in Anhui province. These areas are connected by an ex-
pressway that goes from Shanghai along the Yangtze River to Nanjing, the
capital city of Jiangsu, crosses the river from south to north, and then goes
west up to and beyond Hefei, the capital city of Anhui. The sample enter-
prises were selected randomly from the enterprise lists compiled by the lo-
cal governments of twenty-eight counties selected randomly from the ﬁfty-
three counties. The garment and casting samples consist of seventy-eight
and eighty enterprises, respectively.
We chose speciﬁc industries for our case studies, partly because the pro-
ductivity impacts of privatization cannot be assessed unless we can rea-
sonably assume identical production function parameters among sample
enterprises. We chose the Greater Yangtze River Region because the inﬂu-
ence of SOEs in Shanghai, a center of the state industrial sectors in China,
tends to decline with distance from Shanghai, so there are suﬃcient geo-
graphical variations of the inﬂuence of SOEs. The garment and the casting
industries were chosen partly because they have numerous enterprises over
wide areas and partly because their dependence on SOEs is so diﬀerent: As
of 2000, the metal-casting enterprises depend wholly on SOEs in both in-
put and output transactions, whereas the garment enterprises are far more
independent of SOEs.
The retrospective survey of enterprises provides information on produc-
tion and costs as well as on changing distributions of ownership shares
during the 1995–1998 period, and information on equipment and market-
Productivity Eﬀects of TVE Privatization 233ing channels in 1995 and 1998. Table 9.1 shows the growth rate of real
value-added of the sample enterprises and the number of observations by
area. In this study, value-added was calculated as the gross value of output
minus material cost, energy cost, and payments to shipping agencies and
wholesalers. We applied the method of double deﬂation to the survey data
on nominal value-added, in order to obtain real value-added at the 1998
price.5 The data of real value-added in both 1995 and 1998 are only com-
plete for ﬁfty-six enterprises in the garment industry and ﬁfty-eight in the
casting industry, particularly because of the entry of new enterprises after
1995.6For descriptive exposition, we classiﬁed the study areas into four re-
gions: the suburbs of Shanghai, southeast Jiangsu, southwest Jiangsu, and
Anhui.
Southeast Jiangsu is a traditionally fertile granary area and is close to
Shanghai. With these geographical advantages, the economy in this area
started to grow rapidly with the development of TVREs, as soon as the cen-
tral government began the economic reforms of the late 1970s. By the early
1990s, the successful TVRE-led development strategy pursued in this area
became widely known under the name “Sunan Model of Industrial Devel-
opment.” Since the early 1990s, however, the Sunan model has been chal-
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Table 9.1 Average Annual Growth Rates of Real Value-Added by Study Area,
1995–1998 (%)
Southeast Southwest
Shanghai Jiangsu Jiangsu Anhui Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Garment industry
Growth rate 8.8 9.4 13.5 25.9 15.4
No. of observations 8 14 18 16 56
Casting industry
Growth rate –13.0 2.2 –3.2 7.5 1.1
No. of observations 4 14 20 20 58
5. The price indexes of products of the Garment and Other Fiber Products industry and the
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals industry, assessed at the factory gate by the State
Statistical Bureau (various years), were used as deﬂators for garment and casting products,
respectively. Since price data on shipping and marketing services are not available, we applied
the same deﬂator as the output to these services. As deﬂators for materials in the garment and
the casting industries, we used the factory price index of products of the Textile industry and
the Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals industry, respectively. As a deﬂator for energy
cost, we used the electricity price data in the case of the garment sample and the coal price
data in the case of the casting sample, both of which are provided by the State Statistical Bu-
reau (various years).
6. Each sample includes several new entrants established in 1995, 1996, or 1997. Those
ﬁrms established in 1998 were excluded from the sample. The production data in the ﬁrst year
of operation of new entrants were not used in the analysis because variables in the ﬁrst year
have incomparably greater variances than those in subsequent years.lenged by another model of industrial development formed in and around
the city of Wenzhou in Zhejiang province, where the economy has been
catching up with southeast Jiangsu despite starting from a much lower
level of development (Zhang 1999; Sonobe, Hu, and Otsuka 2002a). In this
“Wenzhou Model of Industrial Development,” high economic growth is
driven by private enterprises and “disguised” TVREs, which were essen-
tially private but disguised themselves as TVREs because private enter-
prises were treated unfavorably by various regulations.
TVREs were also developed in southwest Jiangsu, including in Nanjing.
Probably because Nanjing is the capital of Jiangsu province, there were a
larger number of SOEs and urban collective enterprises in this area than in
southeast Jiangsu. Accordingly, the relative importance of the TVRE sec-
tor was smaller in this area than in southeast Jiangsu. In Anhui, where
manufacturing was least developed among the areas we study, the share of
the SOE sector in gross industrial output was greatest, although the ab-
solute size of the SOE sector was much smaller than in the other areas of
study.7It is interesting to note that the share of private enterprises and self-
employed, small-scale family enterprises in Anhui province was greater
than in the other areas we study in 1995 and earlier.8This is consistent with
the hypothesis that the development of the private sector predominated
in poor areas with few SOEs because local governments in those areas
could not aﬀord to establish a large number of TVREs in cooperation with
SOEs.
As shown in table 9.1, the average size of enterprises, in terms of their
real value-added, grew in all areas in the garment sample but declined in
Shanghai and southwest Jiangsu in the casting sample from 1995 to 1998.9
One factor that made the casting industry stagnant or declining was the
antipollution regulation in urbanized areas. The regulation was most strin-
gent in Shanghai, where the municipal government prohibited the expan-
sion and renewal of foundries. Customers shifted orders away from
foundries in Shanghai to other areas where environmental regulations
were looser, especially to southeast Jiangsu. As a result, casting enterprises
in southeast Jiangsu had a much better growth record than their counter-
parts in southwest Jiangsu as well as in Shanghai. However, casting enter-
prises in Anhui were growing even faster. In the garment sample, the aver-
age growth rate increases with distance from Shanghai. Thus, in both the
casting and garment samples, enterprises in Anhui were growing faster
than in any other areas we study. This suggests that patterns of compara-
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7. Data of industrial output and its composition by sector, aggregated at the provincial
level, are available from the statistical bureaus of Jiangsu and Anhui provinces (various
years).
8. The self-employed enterprises are those with seven or fewer workers.
9. In a discussion of growth performance, attention should be paid to eﬀects of business
cycles.tive advantage in the coastal and central regions were changing signiﬁ-
cantly within labor-intensive industries (such as the garment industry) and
polluting industries (such as the casting industry).
A unique feature of our enterprise survey is that it traces the changing
distribution of ownership within each sample enterprise since its establish-
ment. Oﬃcially registered ownership types (such as TVRE, shareholding,
joint share, foreign joint venture, and private) could be misleading, as the
episodes of numerous “disguised” TVREs in Wenzhou suggest. Such en-
terprises also existed in Jiangsu, according to our own survey. Moreover,
such categorization oﬀers no information on increases in private owner-
ship shares if the registered ownership type of the enterprise remains the
same. Thus, for the purpose of measuring the extent of privatization, it is
more desirable to use continuous indicators of ownership rather than cat-
egorical variables. In practice, the privatization of an enterprise begins
with an estimate of the capitalized value of its assets. Then, the shares of
various owners (e.g., the township government, which invested primarily at
the time of the enterprise’s establishment, and the enterprise itself, which
reinvested proﬁts) are determined according to their previous investments
and services. Hence, the ownership distribution becomes clear after capi-
talization. To trace the ownership distribution before capitalization, we
simply relied on the subjective assessment of key informants, who were
usually general managers.
As shown in table 9.2, we classiﬁed owners into ﬁve types: (1) local gov-
ernment, (2) SOEs, (3) workers, (4) joint ventures with foreign enterprises,
and (5) private owners. In this classiﬁcation, SOEs include urban collective
enterprises. Private owners include, most importantly, the general manager
and other leaders within the enterprise, and a relatively small number of in-
dividuals and enterprises outside the enterprise except SOEs and joint ven-
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Table 9.2 Changing Distribution of Ownership Shares, 1995–1998 (%)
Local Foreign and Private
Government SOEs Workers Joint Ventures Owners Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Garment industry
1995 59.6 5.0 0.5 11.3 23.6 100
1996 54.9 5.3 0.5 11.5 27.7 100
1997 42.5 6.4 2.4 12.0 36.7 100
1998 28.6 5.5 2.7 12.0 51.2 100
Casting industry
1995 77.4 4.1 0.6 2.0 15.9 100
1996 65.7 5.0 1.5 3.3 24.5 100
1997 48.7 6.3 4.6 2.8 37.6 100
1998 28.5 7.1 9.2 2.1 53.1 100tures. In the garment sample, there were a number of enterprises that had
experienced partial privatization before 1995, as reﬂected in private own-
ership of as high as 23.6 percent. In the casting sample, most enterprises
were 100 percent owned in 1995 by the local government, at least nomi-
nally; there were also a small number of completely private enterprises,
most of which were outgrowths of self-employed, family enterprises. Thus,
the average ownership share of local governments was much higher in the
casting sample in 1995. In both samples, however, the pace of privatization
accelerated, and the average ownership share of local governments de-
creased to less than 30 percent and that of private owners increased to
more than 50 percent in 1998. Presumably, this is not a mere coincidence
but a result of the increasing pressure that the central government put on
local governments to fully privatize their TVREs.
In the literature on ambiguous property rights in China, a central ques-
tion is why TVREs could achieve remarkable growth performance in the
1980s and the early 1990s, despite the disincentive eﬀect of the ambiguous
ownership of TVREs on enterprise management. A plausible answer to
this question is that the market in this period in China was characterized
by high transaction costs, which could be reduced by the intervention of lo-
cal governments (Li 1996; Hsiao et al. 1998; Jin and Qian 1998; Chen and
Rozelle 1999). We emphasize that such transaction costs were particularly
high when transactions were made with SOEs (although that is not men-
tioned in this literature). As free-market transactions developed, however,
it is likely that the government support for transactions and the coopera-
tion between TVREs and SOEs gradually have lost signiﬁcance. If this is
the case, privatization ought to increase the production eﬃciency of rural
enterprises. In order to examine the relevance of these arguments, we look
more carefully at the production data in the next two sections.
9.3 Privatization and Growth in the Garment Industry
Garment enterprises in our sample produce a variety of products rang-
ing from cheap underwear to expensive and technically diﬃcult products
such as men’s suits. In view of the presumed importance of marketing chan-
nels, we classify these products into original products, which are designed
and marketed by the sample enterprises themselves, and those produced
under subcontracting with large enterprises, such as SOEs and foreign joint
ventures. Although many of the sample enterprises in southeast Jiangsu
used to be cooperative TVEs or branch factories of SOEs in Shanghai be-
fore free-market transactions were developed, they are now transacting
with a number of SOEs and other enterprises. While subcontracting has
several forms, such as “putting out” and original equipment manufactur-
ing (OEM), we do not distinguish them because such distinctions are prac-
Productivity Eﬀects of TVE Privatization 237tically impossible for some sample enterprises. Instead, we distinguish sub-
contracting with SOEs from subcontracting with other types of enterprises.
Table 9.3 shows the composition of original products, and subcontract-
ing with SOEs and other enterprises, in sales revenues by study area in 1995
and 1998. Compared with Zhejiang province, in our study areas the gar-
ment enterprises, especially those in southeast Jiangsu, have high skills and
use expensive equipment to produce high-quality products, but they are
behind in establishing their own marketing networks. Consistent with this
argument, the proportion of original products to sales revenue in southeast
Jiangsu in 1995 is as low as 18 percent, and that of subcontracting with
SOEs is as high as 45.6 percent. One possible explanation for such marked
diﬀerences between this area and Zhejiang is that the garment enterprises
in southeast Jiangsu could aﬀord to invest in expensive machines by tak-
ing advantage of their geographical proximity to Shanghai to receive sub-
contracting orders from SOEs and foreign ventures. Although the garment
enterprises in Anhui did not have an advantage in this respect, they did
have high shares of subcontracting with SOEs because they tended to fol-
low the Sunan model; that is, they had a high propensity to subcontract
with relatively small local SOEs and urban collectives.
Table 9.4 compares the ownership shares of the local government be-
tween enterprises heavily dependent on SOE subcontracting and the other
sample enterprises. In 1995, SOE subcontracting accounted for more than
half of the sales revenue at twenty-four sample enterprises; they had a
much higher average ownership share of the local government and a lower
average share of private owners than the other sample enterprises. This
suggests that the local government’s involvement in enterprise manage-
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Table 9.3 Composition of Sales Revenue, Garment Industry, 1995 and 1998 (%)
Subcontracting
Original With With Other
Products SOEs Enterprises Total
1995
Shanghai 23.8 22.9 53.3 100
Southeast Jiangsu 18.0 45.6 36.4 100
Southwest Jiangsu 26.8 32.1 41.1 100
Anhui 29.4 49.0 21.6 100
Total 24.9 39.0 36.1 100
1998
Shanghai 23.7 17.9 58.4 100
Southeast Jiangsu 15.7 37.2 47.1 100
Southwest Jiangsu 25.4 28.3 46.3 100
Anhui 26.4 38.7 34.9 100
Total 23.1 32.0 44.9 100ment was helpful in making and maintaining subcontracting contacts with
SOEs in 1995. By 1998, however, there was a reversal in the relationship be-
tween ownership pattern and transaction mode, in which those enterprises
heavily dependent on SOE subcontracting tended to have lower govern-
ment shares and higher private shares. This reversal is consistent with our
maintained hypothesis that the local government’s support for subcon-
tracting with SOEs lost its signiﬁcance in this industry during the period
under study.
Privatization, which clariﬁes ambiguous property rights by increasing
managers’ ownership shares, would enhance the proﬁt-seeking incentives
of managers. If the local government’s support for subcontracting with
SOEs lost its importance, then privatization would improve production
eﬃciency without sacriﬁcing transaction eﬃciencies. To date, however, few
empirical studies have assessed the productivity eﬀects of TVRE privati-
zation or even conﬁrmed its existence. On the contrary, some theoretical
studies presume that the productive eﬃciency of a rural enterprise does not
depend on the type of enterprise ownership (e.g., Weitzman and Xu 1994).
One exception is the pioneering work by Li and Rozelle (2000); they ﬁnd
that although positive productivity eﬀects exist, they are not realized right
after privatization but with adjustment lags of a few years.10
To assess the productivity eﬀect of privatization, we specify a growth
function of the following general form:
(1) G(V )   f[G(K), G(L), PS1995,  PS1996,  PS1997, X],
where G(V), G(K), and G(L) are growth rates of real value added, real cap-
ital stock, and the number of workers, respectively, from 1995 to 1998; PS1995
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Table 9.4 Ownership Share by Transaction Mode, Garment Industry, 1995 and 1998 (%)
Enterprises with  50% SOE Enterprises with  50% SOE




ownership share 73.1 49.2 59.6
Private share 15.5 29.6 23.6
1998
Local government’s 
ownership share 27.9 28.5 28.6
Private share 55.1 48.3 51.2
No. of observations 24 32 56
10. Their use of dummy variables to represent the privatization is questionable in view of
the continuous process of privatization.is the ownership share of private owners in 1995, which is intended to cap-
ture the eﬀect of privatization that took place before 1996;  PS1996 and
 PS1997 are increases in the share of private owners during the entire year
of 1996 and 1997, respectively; and X is a vector of other independent vari-
ables. To estimate the real capital stock, we ﬁrst estimate nominal net in-
vestment from the survey data on the nominal capital stock, and then use
the factory price index of machinery products as our deﬂator.11 The esti-
mated real values of net investments are added to the real value of the initial
investment to obtain the real values of the capital stock in 1995 and 1998.
Since the dependent variable in equation (1) is the growth rate of value-
added rather than physical quantity, it is aﬀected not only by production
eﬃciency but also by transaction eﬃciency. If privatization enhanced pro-
duction eﬃciency without sacriﬁcing transaction eﬃciency, then it would
have a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on output growth. To the extent that the
role of the local government in supporting TVE-SOE transactions was im-
portant, however, privatization would reduce transaction eﬃciency and
cancel part of the positive productivity eﬀect. We focus on the privatization
that took place before 1998 because it is unlikely that privatization in 1998
immediately aﬀected the productivity growth during the 1995–1998 pe-
riod. Vector X includes the proportion of SOE-subcontracting to sales
revenue in 1995, three provincial dummies (with southwest Jiangsu being
the default), the road distance from Shanghai, the road distance from the
nearest exit of the expressway, and the years of operation. If subcontract-
ing with SOEs helped a TVE learn technology, marketing, or management
from SOEs, the proportion of SOE subcontracting would have a positive
eﬀect on labor productivity growth.
To avoid possibly serious multicollinearity between G(K) and G(L), and
to control for the eﬀect of enterprise speciﬁc unobservables, we modify
equation (1) into the following estimable form:
(2) G(V/L)   a0   a1PS1995   a2 PS1996   a3 PS1997   a4X 
  a5G(K/L)   u,
where u is an error term. Since the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio,
G(K/L), on the right-hand side of equation (2) is likely to be endogenous,
we instrument it with ln(L), ln(K/L), and ln(V/L) in the base year (i.e.,
1995) and the growth rate of average annual wage earnings per worker in
the county during the 1995–1998 period.12 Although there is a possibility
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11. Through our survey, we obtained nominal values of initial investments in equipment at
the time of enterprise establishment, and nominal stock values of equipment in 1995 and
1998. We assumed that equal amounts of nominal net investment were made each year be-
tween enterprise establishment and 1995 and between 1995 and 1998. In this way, we esti-
mated annual values of nominal net investment.
12. The data of average labor earnings by county were taken from the statistical bureaus of
Shanghai municipality and of Jiangsu and Anhui provinces (various years).that the choice of the extent of privatization by the local government is
aﬀected by the labor productivity growth of the enterprise,  PS and PS are
treated as exogenous variables at this stage of our study.
Table 9.5 reports three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimates of the
capital-labor ratio (K/L) growth function and the labor productivity
(V/L) growth function. For comparison, the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimates of the reduced form are also shown. In column (1), the K/L ratio
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PS1995 0.019 –0.077 –0.132
(0.135) (0.115) (0.152)
 PS1996 0.029 0.783** 0.780**
(0.284) (0.254) (0.319)
 PS1997 0.023 0.069 0.076
(0.225) (0.207) (0.252)
Proportion of SOE subcontracting  –0.162 –0.196* –0.309**
in 1995 (0.114) (0.108) (0.127)
Shanghai dummy 0.393* –0.132 0.210
(0.230) (0.203) (0.258)
Southeast Jiangsu dummy 0.065 –0.099 –0.040
(0.157) (0.142) (0.176)
Anhui dummy 0.286 0.408* 0.581*
(0.243) (0.213) (0.273)
ln(distance from Shanghai) –0.0003 –0.001 –0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(distance from highway) 0.004* –0.002 –0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)












Constant –0.686 0.428 0.006
(0.424) (0.225) (0.490)
R2 0.505 0.508 0.486
Notes: The sample size is 56. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
**Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level (one-sided test).
*Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.level in 1995 has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on its subsequent growth,
serving as an instrumental variable. The years of operation have a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the K/Lratio growth, which suggests that older en-
terprises tended to have had large labor employment before 1995 and then
hastened to adjust their labor and capital inputs to the soaring wage rate
during the study period. The private ownership share as of 1995 and the
subsequent privatization do not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the K/L ra-
tio growth in the garment sample.
In columns (2) and (3), privatization in 1996 has a positive and signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect on the growth of labor productivity, which strongly supports the
hypothesis that privatization improves production eﬃciency. In both col-
umns, the productivity eﬀect of privatization in 1997 is positive but in-
signiﬁcant. These results are consistent with the ﬁnding by Li and Rozelle
(2000) that the productivity eﬀect is realized not right after privatization
but with an adjustment time lag of a few years. The result, that the pro-
portion of SOE subcontracting has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on la-
bor productivity growth, suggests that the sample enterprises already had
absorbed technologies and management know-how from SOEs by the
sample period, and that transactions with technologically more advanced
enterprises, such as foreign joint ventures, or the establishment of own
marketing channels were becoming important for productivity growth. As
shown in column (2), the estimate of the coeﬃcient, a5, of G(K/L) in equa-
tion (2) is 0.667. This is reasonably close to the sample average of (1 – labor
share), where the labor share is measured as the ratio of nominal wage pay-
ments to nominal value-added.
9.4 Privatization and Growth in the Casting Industry
Unlike subcontracting in the garment industry, casting subcontracting
was done almost exclusively with SOEs, especially those in and around
Shanghai. Even in the case of original products manufactured and sold
freely by TVEs, major buyers were mostly SOEs, and suppliers of impor-
tant inputs, such as coal and pig iron, were also SOEs. Thus, transactions
and cooperation with SOEs were indispensable for casting enterprises.
Moreover, the quality of cast products is diﬃcult to observe visually, espe-
cially in the case of complicated shapes and large sizes. Hence, the cost
of inter-enterprise transactions tended to be high in this industry, even
though free-market transactions were developed in the 1990s. Therefore, it
is likely that the role of the local government in supporting transactions
with SOEs was greater in this industry than in the garment industry.
According to table 9.6, original products accounted for a large part of
sales revenue in Anhui but much less in areas closer to Shanghai. Enter-
prise managers told us that original products tended to be parts for light
consumer goods and relatively simple machines, such as small pumps and
242 Tetsushi Sonobe and Keijiro Otsukatractor engines, while parts for heavy equipment, such as huge engines for
large ships, were produced under subcontracts with SOEs. The heavy con-
centration of large SOEs in Shanghai and its immediate vicinity seems to
explain the ﬁnding from table 9.6 that the proportion of subcontracting de-
creases as the distance from Shanghai increases. As shown in table 9.7, the
ownership structure of original product-oriented enterprises was similar to
that of subcontracting-oriented enterprises in 1995. In 1998, the diﬀerence
in ownership structure between these two types of enterprises was a little
greater than in 1995, but it was not statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 9.8reports the estimation results of the K/Lratio function and the
labor productivity growth function for the casting sample. This table is or-
ganized in the same way as table 9.5 except that the proportion of SOE-
subcontracting to sales revenue in table 9.5 is replaced by the proportion of
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Table 9.7 Ownership Share by Transaction Mode, Casting Industry, 
1995 and 1998 (%)
Enterprises with  50% Enterprises with  50% 




ownership share 79.0 75.8 77.4
Private share 15.8 16.1 15.9
1998
Local government’s 
ownership share 36.4 20.6 28.5
Private share 46.4 59.8 53.1
No. of observations 29 29 58
Table 9.6 Composition of Sales Revenue, Casting Industry, 1995 and 1998 (%)
Original Products Subcontract Total
1995
Shanghai 15.0 85.0 100
Southeast Jiangsu 33.0 67.0 100
Southwest Jiangsu 57.6 42.4 100
Anhui 64.3 35.7 100
Total 51.0 49.0 100
1998
Shanghai 15.5 84.5 100
Southeast Jiangsu 25.3 74.6 100
Southwest Jiangsu 59.5 40.5 100
Anhui 60.0 40.0 100
Total 48.4 51.6 100original products in table 9.8. In column (1), the private ownership share as
of 1995 had a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the growth of the K/L ratio
during the 1995–1998 period, whereas privatization that took place in1997
had a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the K/L ratio growth. These results
suggest that privatized enterprises at ﬁrst reduced excess capital more than
labor but then increased it as production eﬃciency was expected to im-
prove. The Anhui dummy has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the K/L
ratio growth; this is likely to be a reﬂection of the tendency toward geo-
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PS1995 –0.298* 0.0005 –0.104
(0.145) (0.199) (0.242)
 PS1996 0.069 0.421* 0.480
(0.182) (0.249) (0.304)
 PS1997 0.339* –0.435* –0.166
(0.189) (0.238) (0.315)
Proportion of original product  –0.069 0.014 –0.002
in 1995 (0.103) (0.137) (0.172)
Shanghai dummy –0.042 –0.309 –0.294
(0.393) (0.522) (0.272)
Southeast Jiangsu dummy 0.134 0.023 0.117
(0.186) (0.250) (0.310)
Anhui dummy 0.444** 0.425* 0.618*
(0.166) (0.207) (0.277)
ln(distance from Shanghai) –0.258 –0.196 –0.294
(0.163) (0.208) (0.272)
ln(distance from highway) –0.011 0.097 0.084
(0.046) (0.062) (0.077)












Constant –0.767 0.769 0.890
(0.960) (1.177) (1.603)
R2 0.397 0.302 0.254
Notes: The sample size is 56. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
**Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.graphical growth convergence. The K/Lratio, labor productivity, and labor
employment size in 1995 in column (1), which are excluded from column
(2), have positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on the subsequent growth of the K/
L ratio. Hence they serve as instrumental variables.
The most important result shown in table 9.8 is that privatization in 1996
had a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor productivity growth, even
though the productivity eﬀect of privatization was weaker in the casting in-
dustry than in the garment industry. Interestingly, privatization in 1997 has
a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor productivity growth. These results
are consistent with our arguments that the temporarily detrimental eﬀect
of privatization on transaction eﬃciency was more substantial in the cast-
ing industry than in the garment industry, and that the productivity eﬀect
of privatization was realized with time lags. The Anhui dummy has a pos-
itive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor productivity as well as on K/L ratio
growth, which supports the hypothesis that the center of gravity in the cast-
ing industry was shifting from the coastal region, such as the suburbs of
Shanghai, to the central region, including Anhui province.
9.5 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we ﬁnd that privatization of TVREs has been taking place
rapidly in the Greater Yangtze River Region since the middle of the 1990s.
Although this rapid privatization was due partly to the policy of the cen-
tral government, we argue that it was related closely to the increasing im-
portance of free-market transactions which made the intervention of local
governments in the management of TVREs less productive. Thus, we ad-
vance the hypothesis that the recent privatization improved the production
eﬃciency of enterprises. Our hypothesis clearly is supported by the three-
stage estimation of the capital-labor ratio growth and labor productivity
growth functions for both the garment and metal-casting industries. This
indicates that productivity was enhanced signiﬁcantly by privatization
with a few years’ time lag. The estimation results suggest that the produc-
tivity eﬀect of privatization was greater in an industry where products and
materials were more eﬃciently sold and bought in free markets.
At this point, we must emphasize that in all likelihood, our analysis has
identiﬁed mere short-run eﬀects of privatization on productivity. In the
longer run, privatization will have greater eﬀects on productivity than es-
timated in this study, as free markets of products and materials develop.
In our observation, enormous diﬀerences still exist between private enter-
prises in Zhejiang province and the Greater Yangtze River Region. First,
current competition among enterprises in Zhejiang province centers
around the production of diﬀerentiated, improved products, often with
brand names, and the establishment of a nationwide marketing network.
In Jiangsu, however, competition through brand names and the establish-
ment of own marketing networks began late and has taken place only
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dustries tend to be clustered in Zhejiang province in order to enjoy the so-
called “localization economies” arising from information externalities, the
division and specialization of labor among enterprises, and possibly the
formation of skilled labor markets (see, e.g., Zhang 1999; Sonobe, Hu, and
Otsuka 2002a,b). Such industrial clusters seem to have been formed grad-
ually through free-market competition over the last two decades. In con-
trast, industrial clusters have been less developed in the Greater Yangtze
River Region except in the Sunan area near Shanghai. It is likely that in the
longer run, the improvement of products and marketing capacity and the
geographical concentration of industries will take place in the Greater
Yangtze River Region as well.
The upshot is that we have to distinguish carefully between the short-run
eﬀects of privatization, which would have arisen from improved manage-
ment incentives, and its longer-run eﬀects, which would arise from invest-
ments in the development of improved products and the establishment of
marketing systems, as well as from the formation of industrial clusters. Our
result, that the short-run incentive eﬀect of privation is signiﬁcantly positive,
strongly indicates that privatization can be a driving force leading to the
continued improvement of productivity over long periods, so far as privati-
zation enhances market competition among enterprises across wide areas.
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Comment Yun-Wing Sung
This paper draws on a unique data set on TVEs of the garment and metal-
casting enterprises in the Great Yangtze River Region from 1995 to 1998,
and presents evidence that productivity of TVEs was signiﬁcantly en-
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Yun-Wing Sung is professor in and chairman of the department of economics at the Chi-
nese University of Hong Kong.hanced by privatization. Despite ambiguous property rights (TVEs are
owned by lower-level local governments), TVEs achieved remarkable
growth in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, since the early 1990s, the
growth performance of TVEs deteriorated sharply and fell behind that of
private enterprises. Privatization of TVEs occurred on a large scale in the
mid-1990s.
The contrasting performance of TVEs in two diﬀerent periods of
China’s reform era remains a puzzle in transition economics that has not
been studied adequately. Sonobe and Otsuka explain the puzzle by the
“plausible hypothesis” that, in the ﬁrst stage of the reform era, China’s
market was characterized by high transaction costs, which could be re-
duced by the intervention of local governments. Such transaction costs
were particularly high when transactions were made with SOEs. However,
as China’s market matured with economic reforms, government support
for transactions between TVEs and SOEs lost its signiﬁcance. The plaus-
ible hypothesis is very interesting in transition economics as it provides a
credible argument that gradualism is superior to a big bang.
While the article has presented persuasive evidence that productivity of
TVEs was signiﬁcantly enhanced by privatization since 1995, it provides
only an indirect test of the plausible hypothesis. The authors argue that, as
transactions with SOEs account for a bigger share of sales in the metal-
casting industry than the garment industry, reduction of transaction costs
through government intervention should be more signiﬁcant in the metal-
casting industry. The test shows that privatization has a weaker eﬀect on
productivity in metal casting than in garment. This result is consistent with
the plausible hypothesis because privatization would reduce transaction
eﬃciency more substantially in metal casting than in garment. However, as
the casting industry is quite diﬀerent from the garment industry, there can
be many other explanations of the weaker eﬀect of privatization on pro-
ductivity in metal casting. The test of the plausible hypothesis is not con-
clusive.
The plausible hypothesis is very interesting, but also diﬃcult to test. As
the data set only involves two industries during 1995–1998, conclusive test-
ing of the plausible hypothesis is not possible. A longer time span, more in-
dustries, or both would be required.
Despite the inconclusive test of the plausible hypothesis, the article is
valuable in a lot of ways. The enterprise survey is very carefully done. For
instance, it traces the changing distribution of ownership of capital stock
for each sample enterprise. To tackle the problem that private TVEs had an
incentive to be politically correct by disguising themselves under collective
ownership, the authors also rely on the subjective assessment of key in-
formants, usually general managers. The survey also has detailed informa-
tion on composition of sales by mode of transaction (i.e., original product
versus subcontracting with SOEs), which provides some data for indirectly
248 Tetsushi Sonobe and Keijiro Otsukatesting the plausible hypothesis. As a whole, the article is a very valuable
contribution to the literature on transition economics.
Comment Yang Yao
This paper provides an empirical assessment of the productivity eﬀects of
TVE privatization in China. The results are illuminating and provide use-
ful policy implications. Although privatization has converted almost all
the TVEs and most of the small and medium SOEs into private ﬁrms, the
word “privatization” is still a kind of taboo in Chinese mainstream publi-
cations, so empirical studies on privatization are still scant both inside and
outside China. The evidence provided by this paper thus is both timely and
informative. It is especially interesting that privatization is found to be the
most eﬀective for ﬁrms that are more involved in free-market transactions.
Privatization in China has taken a bottom-up approach and has been in-
duced by economic forces. There have been both theories and anecdotal
evidence showing that the spontaneous privatization in China has been in-
duced by market liberalization of the Chinese economy, but there has been
no systematic evidence to prove it. This paper’s ﬁnding partly ﬁlls the gap
by providing indirect evidence (direct evidence would have shown that
ﬁrms more involved in free-market transactions are more likely to be pri-
vatized, which is not done in this paper).
While the paper is well done, I would like to point out two areas that fur-
ther work can improve upon.
The authors have a large data set, but they use only two sectors for their
study, which seriously limits the sample size. The authors argue that they
have done so because diﬀerent industries use diﬀerent technologies. How-
ever, this issue can be taken care of by estimating a diﬀerent production
function for each industry and then adding industrial dummies in their
analysis.
The authors use the change of the private share in a ﬁrm as the indicator
of the extent of privatization of the ﬁrm. There are several issues sur-
rounding this deﬁnition. First, there are both initially private and priva-
tized TVEs in the sample. By the authors’ deﬁnition of privatization, an
initially private ﬁrm has a value of zero for this variable. This considerably
weakens the implications of this variable because it actually measures an
adjustment of the ownership structure in the ﬁrm regardless of the direc-
tion of the adjustment. A possible improvement is to assign a value of 1 to
those initially private ﬁrms so the direction of the adjustment is pinned
down toward privatization. Second, the starting year of 1995 is not the
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Yang Yao is professor at the China Center for Economic Research, Beijing University.starting year for privatization, I suppose, at least not for most ﬁrms. As a
result, the current deﬁnition of privatization would be biased for ﬁrms that
had started privatization before 1995, pretty much like those initially
private ﬁrms. Third, the lack of an eﬀect of privatization in the year 1996–
1997 may just be a reﬂection of the problem, since in those two years pri-
vatization might well have ﬁnished so there is not much variation in the
data.
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